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Vietnam (VN) is a transitional economy and one of a small number of
nations which is successfully managing its transition from a centrally
planned command economy to a socialist-based market one. The reform
towards a market economy began with the 6th Congress of the Party in
December 1986. Since the Doi Moi (renovation process), VN has implemented
an economic reform program together with a step-by-step reform of state
machinery which stretched over a decade.
The economic reforms focusing on removing price controls, improving
macroeconomic management, encouraging foreign investment, renovating
the legal system, etc., have brought positive results. These efforts brought
impressive gains: inflation fell from 400 percent in the mid-1980s to 4.5
percent in 1996' and GDP grew to an average of 8.2 percent for the past five
years. VN is now a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and is hoping to
join ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFI_A) and World Trade Organization (WTO).
However, Vietnam is still a difficult place for private businesses
because there is confusion between local and central authorities, and there
are many unclear administrative hurdles as well as undefined legal
framework. Vietnam had been promised US$8.5 billion in official
development assistance (ODA) in various consultative group meetings, but
had been able to absorb only 28 percent. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
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commitment stood at more than US$29 billion in December 1997 but only
35 percent has been invested. The present situation is brought about by
the lack of "absorptive capacity and managerial skills" in the public service.
The first decade (1987-1997) of Doi Moi may be seen as a period
when the main macroeconomic and institutional components were put in
place. This growth has brought better living standards but is unevenly
distributed as shown by Vietnam's latest Living Standard Survey (LSS). 2
This in turn is brought about by major impediments to the economic
transformation which include: macroeconomic imbalances, incomplete legal
and institutional frameworks for economic activities, imperfect financial
system and a public administration geared to execute "political matters"
rather than economic and managerial tasks.
Despite noble goals for the general populace, the transition process
to the market in VN can only flourish in a conducive institutional setting
that can deliver support and solve problems and disputes. VN faces the
task of public administration reform (PAR), which is becoming an imperative
requirement to sustain growth, especially in the new environment created
by the Asian crisis.
This paper examines VN's institutional debates and reforms during
the decade 1987-1997. It maintains that VN started its "renovation process"
due to the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but
which was however marred by "internal strife" between "reformers" and
"conservatives." Thus, the sustainability of the transition to market economy
will now just depend greatly on a clear division of labor and a proper balance
between the Party and the government. WitI_ the Asian crisis still paralyzing
most economies in the region, there is an urgency to carry out further
reforms.
The first section gives a brief overview of VN's institutional reforms,
their context and the approaches done during the past decade. The second
section identifies and analyzes problems and challenges. Evidence suggests
that the prescription for economic reforms cannot be effectively carried out
without an efficient administrative capacity to manage the change.
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OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM IN VIETNAM
Vietnam's renovation process was influenced by the crisis context of
the mid-1980s. There are two waves of institutional (economic, political
and administrative) reforms. The first wave focused on research for legitimacy
and rejuvenation of the Party's cadre through the legal-rational approach.
It reflected the adjustment of institutions and procedures to economic
development, the opening to the outside world and the building of basic
legal regulatory infrastructure framework.
The second wave aims at perfecting the functioning and staffing of
state institutions. This second and ongoing wave of reforms encounter
difficulties and is stalled.
Context
Vietnam was unified in 1975. Legitimacy of the regime was based on
socialism and the struggle for independence. Yet, the economic results of
the period 1975-1985 were disappointing: slow growth, massive scale of
migration of boat people, sharp decline in living standards, high inflation
and famines that struck some regions of North VN. This was aggravated by
the mounting disbelief in socialism as an instrument for development.
While VN was also isolated because of its invasion of Cambodia, it
was the collapse of the Soviet bloc that forced the party to end decades of
isolation and embark on an array of economic and social reforms.
Considerable internal discussion and economic concerns led to the Doi Moi
process during the 6th Congress of the Party. Back then, there were no
theories, materials, books and experiences on "the transition process to the
market system" to learn from except the crises in Eastern Europe, Perestroika
in the Soviet Union and the positive results of the Chinese economic reforms.
At that time, there were 47 ministerial bodies, with exclusive reliance on
the bureaucracy to manage all aspects of socioeconomic life. (During the
war, economic and institutional organizations were decentralized.) Partial
reforms were launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s but were
counterproductive.
Started in 1987, the Doi Moi reform aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The tempo of change was accelerated after 1989 with more economic and318 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
financial reforms that helped to free the economy from state control and to
establish policies that aimed at encouraging market economy. The Foreign
Investment Law was prepared and was revised many times, the last being
in 1996. The Land Law was enacted in 1988 and revised in 1993. During
the Doi Moi decade, about 100 laws covering a broad range of areas such as
banking, commercial contracts, business, etc., including the promulgation
of the Civil Code in 1.996, were passed to support the transition to the
market economy.
During 1987 - 1991, all subsidies were abolished and the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) sector was encouraged to reorganize and reform itself.
Many small-scale enterprises in trade, retail, catering and other services
were sold, forced to close, or lay off their workers. The retrenchment in the
state sector between 1988-1993 affected over 800,000 people and reduced
the number of SOEs from 12,000 to around 6,000. 3
First Wave of Public Administration Reform (PAR)
The institutional Doi Moi covers both administrative and political
changes. The first wave of public administration reform (PAR) focused on
emphasizing the role of the Party through the legal-rational approach, i.e.,
the role and composition of the National Assembly (NA), the holding of
elections and the preparation of a national PAR program.
Party and the Rule of Law
The first reform in 1990 aimed at preparing a new justification for a
"market economy with socialist orientation." As there were no successful
experiences to learn from, the intense debate was "on how to emphasize the
role of the Party within the Rule of Law." To justify the move from socialist
to rational-legal values, several formulas were used, such as "a state of the
people, by the people and for the people," "a state governed by the rule-of-
law," and the definition of market system with socialist orientation as a
state in which "the people are rich, the country is strong and a society is
civilized." Law is seen more and more as a channel to resolve conflicts and
the bureaucracy's arbitrariness and to redress grievances.
aWorld Bank, "Economic Report on Industrialization and Industrial Policy," Washington,
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The justification of VN's strategy for legitimacy was based on a public
4
administration (PA) report which:
i 1. Exists to serve the people {a state of the people, by the people and for
the people)
2. Functions in a state governed by the rule of law
3. Is able, as the executive arm of government, to implement government
policies and priorities effectively, on the basis of division of
responsibility and of coordination
4. Is established on the basis of "democratic centralism" manifested
through such approaches as centralization, decentralization,
deconcentration, devolution, delegation and other related approaches
5. Is placed within a political system where people exercise their
ownership rights
The new Constitution, put in place in 1992, was the first step to
support the transition which emphasizes the rule of law. The Party obtained
legitimacy through Art. 4 of the new Constitution. The new role of the National
Assembly was another step. A limited number of elections were conducted
to include nonparty member, thereby allowing "screened elite" to express
their opinion and likewise showing that the party was considering wide
range of opinions and interests. It was a channel for some independent
voices to be heard.
The first 7 percent of nonparty members were included during the
NA election in 1992. This was increased to 20 percent in the 1997 election
which fielded 663 candidates for 450 positions and where women and
minorities represented over 30 percent. Thus, a new generation of leaders
emerged from the parliamentary ranks.
Today, the NA, the highest body of the people vested with constitutional.
and legislative authority, plays a growing role as seen during the 10th NA
meeting in November 1996 which approved only 8 out of 12 ministers
presented by the government.
4SRV, "National Public Administration Reform Program," GCOP, Hanoi, May 1993.32,0 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The National PAR program
In 1993, after two years of discussions, the Government of Vietnam
5
(GOV) published a national program on Public Administration Reform
(NPAR). According to this document, the guidelines on administrative reforms
are the following:
• "... To establish a unified institutional system for State administrative
organization, defining the role and operational mechanism for the
three powers: legislative, executive and judiciary within a unitary
State model. The machinery of the central public administration ...will
rationally address relationships amongst central-level organizations,
and the distribution of authority amongst government agencies, ...;
• "To establish the relationship between the political leadership of the
Communist Party of Vietnam and the State machinery;
• "Identification of principles and directions for addressing the
relationships between the central Government and local authorities;
° "Identification of the role of the local authorities: People's Council,
People's committee, and clarification of its responsibilities, functions,
and authority..."
In May 1994, the GOV issued Resolution No.38/CP directing all
agencies to simplify and adjust administrative procedures pertaining to
various services. The responsibility to coordinate all the activities related to
PAR was given to the Government Committee for Organization and Personnel
(GCOP).
Likewise, the GOV tested the rejuvenation of leaders in the first multi-
candidates election for provincial People's Council (provincial assembly} in
December 1994. Since the provincial assembly selected the head of People's
Committee (province government}, the election which has been instrumental
in the emergence of a younger and more educated generation of communist
leaders at local level boosted the legitimacy of provincial leaders.
The School of Public Administration and its annexes were established
and provincial schools were consolidated.
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Furthermore, the number of government bodies was reduced from
76 to 49 by merging ministries and state corporations. Similar reductions
were done at the provincial level.
The first wave of PAR reform adjusted procedures under the
"command" system to the "market" system. It required changes in the legal
and institutional framework, which were carried out with no opposition
whatever.
Second / Ongoing Wave of PAR
The second wave of reform aims at improving the function of and
further reducing state institutions. While the first wave went smoothly,
this wave of reform was besieged by difficulties and is presently stalled.
Party Plenum
In January 1995, the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party supported the drive for institutional changes and. resulted
in a resolution on "Continuing to build and perfect the State of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam Taking a Step toward Reforming the State
Administrative System." This document marked the start of the second
wave of the institutional reform and laid out the most current state strategy
in respect of public administration reform, for which there are five major
thrusts:
• To continue renewal of the organization and work of the National
Assembly;
• To continue the step-by-step reforms in the state administrative
system;
• To renew the work and organization of the judiciary bodies;
° To promote the people's role as master of the State; and
° To strengthen the Party's leadership in the State.
Subsequently, an action plan dated March 20, 1.995 was prepared to
combat structural weaknesses. It encompassed all levels of government
and civil service and aimed at reforming state organizations, reducing waste,
combating corruption, upgrading the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, etc.322 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Organizational￿institutional reforms
This second wave of reform that started in 1995 focuses on changing
the function of and reducing the size of the state apparatus, on streamlining
administrative procedures, including the reduction of but strengthening
key ministries and organisations.
First, ministerial functions shifted toward a policy-oriented role instead
of direct involvement in economic activities. An important aspect of this
economic restructuring was to redefine the role and functions of government
6
in the economy which included:
• Managing the macroeconolnic environment, fiscal balance and
monetary policies;
• Coordinating central, regional and local government activities;
• Creating the legal, financial, administrative and regulatory
infrastructure for the market;
• Managing and creating a framework for investment, innovation and
structural change; and
• Creating a governmental capacity to administer a market economy
including the creation of a capable and honest civil service.
The management of SOEs changed consequently, free them from their
"parent ministry." New measures aiming at SOEs included: (1) registration
of companies; (2} equitization of a number of state-owned companies; (3)
enterprise management reform; and (4) abolishment of "parent ministry."
Presently, SOEs are classified into public and commercial ventures. With
decision 91/'FF of March 1994, 16 "enterprise groupings" have been created
along 47 other SOEs. Those in the commercial sector will be "equitized."
However, there is conflict between the conservative faction of the
Party which wants to retain control over the economy through SOEs and
the progressive faction which believes in higher speed of renovation and
the shedding of commercial enterprises. Adding to the conflicts are
bureaucrats and managers who have a vested interest in slowing down the
_'Le Dang Dom_h in "International Colloquium on Public Administration," Hanoi, Sept. 24-
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reform for their own advantage as seen by recent corruption scandals. And
7
so because of resistance, few enterprises were equitized.
At present, the SOE's reform is stalled.
Second, many ministries were merged and their functions were
evolved. In each ministry, each province and each public organization, a
PAR committee was formed to review procedures and streamline
organizations. During this period, the number of ministries was further
reduced from 27 to 22 and the division of provinces from 57 to 61.
Third, the government introduced more modern public administration
through the Budget Law of 1996, the information technology (IT) program
in 1994 and management methodologies and systems. The creation of an
administrative tribunal system was an additional step toward relying on
the rule of law to solve administrative conflicts and to redress grievances.
Over 20 drafts of the Civil Service Statute were prepared and discussed
during a three-year period and finally enacted at the end of 1997. Another
priority was the need to train civil servants for new tasks. The training and
upgrading of civil and public servants including administrative judges
through a 3-month course, seminars, etc., helped to strengthen the role of
the state in establishing the rule of law and in supporting the transition to
the market economy.
There was more openness in dealing with PAR. Discussions on PA
were frequent and public. VN was now willing to seek advice and funding
from international organizations such as the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), SIDA, etc. Study tours were organized for senior civil
servants. These initiatives culminated with the organization of the
International Colloquium on PA organized in Hanoi in September 19968
with the participation of more than 22 countries and organizations.
Exchanges created a more conducive environment for further exchanges
and learning. A pilot project encompassing ministries and provinces and
cities to develop a methodology for the institutionalization of PAR 9 was
prepared.
7See ibid 4/ page 107
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Since 1.991, a collective leadership system has governed VN. The
maneuvering of those competing forces behind the scene that impacted the
10
PAR called for a shrewd and incremental strategy. A UNDP paper
summarized well the PAR strategy to reform: incrementalism and
pragmatism as an effective strategy to maintain stability.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES
VN follows the "market system with socialist orientation" and as
reforms deepen and widen, ideological and technical problems arise. The
communist party of VN (CPV) is split into conservative and progressive
factions. For the conservative leaders, the reform has undermined the role
of the Party. On the other hand, economic difficulties point out the need
for wider reforms and the creation of a professional civil service (CS) to
manage the change.
Ideological Debates and Problems
VN wants funds and technology from the outside but fears that alien
ideas such as democracy, human rights, etc., will infiltrate the country
coming in with the needed funds and technology. Justifiably, indeed, because
after a lifetime of Marxism, many leaders are queasy about a market
economy.
For its "Doi Moi" program, Vietnam, like many other countries of
Asia, has been learning from and using Japan's model of high. savings,
close cooperation of government and business, and export-oriented growth.
VN government pushed investment toward specific, targeted state-owned
enterprises, making decisions that often poured money into nonprofitable
sectors. As there are conservatives or ideologists who believe in socialist
orthodoxy and think that socialism is only "temporary" during recession,
there is still the strong belief in a "market economy with. socialist orientation,"
i.e., along socialist ideology lines and practices such as in the case of China.
Conservatives belong to the security and party apparatus with minimal
10j. Ryan and J. Wandel, "Vietnam's Relbrm Experience - the qucst for stability during
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exposure to the outside world and the running of an economy in a peaceful
but competitive environment.
Progressives or liberals, on the other hand, are those who think that
in order to sustain development, VN needs faster change to "catch-up" with
the neighboring countries. These are the elements that have worked with
and have been exposed to the outside world. They belong, in majority, to
the executive branch. For them, ideology is less important, more important
is that VN develops.
Unfortunately, conservatives and liberals are deeply split over the
extent and pace of reform - one that is much needed by the country.
8th Congress Debates
When the economy has been stabilized, the Party wanted to return to
old ways. The draft political report prepared for this Congress rejected
political pluralism and forbade party members to engage in business. The
draft economic report targeted SOEs to represent 60 percent of GDP in year
2010. The tone was strongly in favor of orthodoxy, thus sending conflicting
signals to the private sector: that the Party still considered profit as
"exploitation" since it forbade its members to own businesses. Another
conflicting signal is the promotion of SOEs.
The feeling is that implementation of the economic/institutional
changes has undermined the dominant role of the Party. The government,
on the other hand, resents Party efforts to micro-manage and interfere with
the functioning of the government. This ideological resistance is exacerbated
by the feeling of losing political control, thus, the fear of "peaceful evolution"
(code word for the negative U.S. imperialist influence). "Social evils,"
frequently exposed by the party-controlled media, are excuses to slow down
the renovation process.
It is worth remembering that VN introduced its Doi Moi reforms in
1986 not out of altruism, but because its hands were forced. Then, as now,
the party's legitimacy is eroding. The people were put off by the government's
expensive foreign adventures (Cambodia and China), its dictatorial style
and mishandling of the economy. There are the political rumblings of which
the most obvious manifestation is the sporadic uprisings in the countryside32,6 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
in 1997, when, in the northern coastal province of Thai Binh and Nam
Dinh, traditionally a cradle of Communist Party support, peasants and
workers, tired of venal local party bureaucrats, took several hostages.
All factions agreed that the "second best" option was the continuation
of the Doi Moi, thus, the reiteration of commitment for PAR reforms. A
fragile compromise was found with the maintenance of the triumvirate
leadership combining various factions in the party. The result was that the
decisionmaking process concerning the PAR would likely slow down as it
was hard to regenerate a unified leadership in a very divided environment.
Presently, central committee members are, on the average, younger and
more educated. However, the result of the 8th Congress is an unsettling
official policy toward building a market system. Although some PAR problems
enunciated in the national programme for PAR 11have found solutions such
as the reduction in the size of the government, etc., the crucial relationship
between the Party and the state machinery has yet to be addressed• As
PAR deepens and widens, Party and State relationship moves to the center
of the stage, but manifesting that the fear of the Party must be alleviated to
be able to deepen and consequently sustain administrative and institutional
reforms.
Following the 8'h Congress, VN was struck by two major problems:
rural disturbances in various regions and the Asian financial crisis.
Rural disturbances
In 1996 and early 1997, there were violent clashes between peasants
and local authorities over farmland because of lack of compensation for
their land.
Between April and August 1997, the province of Thai Binh was rocked
by protests by peasants over corruption, tax issues and exaction of illegal
• . 12
fees by local authorities, triggered by the imposition of numerous taxes
and fees, requests for _oluntary labor' and widespread abuse of power by
local authorities. However, complaints and petitions were not addressed
_See ibid 5/.
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although protests at the district and provincial levels were legal and
organized 13 in a peaceful manner. This unrest spread to 130 out of 235
villages in the province and six out of 7 districts of the province.
Many incidents likewise occurred in Ha Tay province. Local authorities
were charged with disregarding regulations on land management and land
rights. In Dong Nai province, at the end of 1997, several hundred villagers
14
staged protest over land rights.
The Asian crisis
In July 1997, Thailand was forced by speculative attacks to let its
currency float freely, causing panic and financial havoc in several
neighboring countries. The financial crisis meant a huge outflow of foreign
capital from Asian stock markets, a liquidity crisis and increasing social
problems.
In December, South Korea agreed to a $57 billion rescue package
and Indonesia negotiated for a $43 billion bailout. The uncertainty in the
region continued as Indonesian President Suharto had to step down in May
1998. Several Asian countries began to push Japan to stabilize its economy
as the weakening of the yen put increased pressure on the region's battered
economies.
The impact of the crisis is far more profound and painful in VN
than in other crisis-ridden countries as VN is much poorer and with less
capability to absorb adjustments. _sIndirect effects of the region's economic
crisis have already been felt with a drop in foreign investment and trade as
Vietnam relies on Asian countries for 70 percent of foreign investment and
60 percent of export sales. World Bank estimates suggest that the US$2.6
billion in foreign investment pledged in 1997 would shrink to $1.5 billion
this year as investors headed home. The rate of growth in exports in the
first five months of this year was 13 percent, about half what it was a year
earlier. Furthermore, in 1997 the International Monetary Fund cancelled
the last $176-million installment of a $530-million loan to help reforms,
l_Nhan Dan newspaper, Feb. 5, 1998.
VLNhan Dan newspaper, March 14, 1998.
l_"East Asia: From Miracle to Crisis," UNDP, Hanoi, June 1.998.328 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
after Vietnam failed to take concrete steps to enact previously promised
changes.
Vietnam's economy remains one of the most information-starved in
the world. Basic economic indicators such as national budget, overseas
indebtedness and foreign currency reserves are state secrets. With Asia in
a state of economic crisis, Vietnam must act swiftly to bring greater
transparency in .financial dealings, cut off cash aid to ailing state enterprises
and let its currency move to a more competitive exchange rate, in order to
16
avoid the worst effects of the region's economic crisis. VN's recent
devaluation of the dong was the latest in a series of moves that suggest that
the party and the government know they have no option but to try to
somehow deepen long-stalled reforms.
Institutional Problems
The central-provincial administrative relationship is tenuous because
of lack of administrative procedures. Aside from this, there are also numerous
organisational problems as well as low pay, in the range of only US$20 - 50
per month. Furthermore, there is a lack of a professional civil service to
prepare a long-term strategy for change.
Central-local government
During the war, every district had to live in autarky, thus, there was
the compelling need to create a modern local administration. The
implementation of the 1992 Constitution and the _'cloning" of central
institutions at provincial level raised many problems. The responsibilities
of the People's Council (provincial assembly), the unclear vertical and
horizontal relationship between the People's Council, the People's Committee
(provincial government) and central authorities created many administrative
hurdles. War legacy of regional self-sufficiency and parochial behavior of
provincial governments exacerbated this problem and have become a
bottleneck to development. The Prime Minister (PM), the head of the executive
branch, cannot sanction and replace immediately the head of a provincial
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administration. The GOV is reviewing these problems but any improvement
in the functions of the provincial administration or its modernization will
require a change in the Constitution.
Organizational problems
The Government Committee for Organization and Personnel (GCOP)
in charge of public service created in the early 1990s is a staff agency. Yet,
it is entrusted with operational responsibilities for the management of senior
staff executives on one hand, the task of strengthening human resources
in the Civil Service estimated at 1.3 million on the other hand and recently,
with PA reform responsibilities without changing its overall stature within
iv
the GOV' structures. However, GCOP faces many constraints:
• Lack of adequate facilities, equipment and methods;
° Lack of capacity to design, prepare and negotiate projects for the
public administration; and
° Insufficient opportunities for professional development of the staff in
a market environment and in foreign countries.
With fewer than 150 staff, GCOP finds it difficult to plan and
implement GOV's PAR reform efforts, and to manage and train the civil
service personnel. The lack of a modern civil service statute (although a
revised version has been passed as this paper was being drafted) and the
legacy of strong ideoloKy resulted in an administration that is still basically
ruled by men instead of by law. Thus, many administrations, both at central
and local levels, do things in unpredictable ways. Even if GCOP is equipped
with human and material resources, it will not be effective because the
current "structure" does not give it enough authority to carry out its
responsibilities, already incompatible as they are.
Another constraint is the lack of a professional civil service and an
inadequate understanding of reforms and the role of government in a market-
based economy. Civil service entrance exams are new. The training and
17GCOP, "Strengthening of the capacity of GCOP," SIDA,Hanoi, May 19973.]0 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
upgrading of civil and public servants including administrative judges, etc.,
are basic• _s Yet, personnel selection in the public sector is more dependent
on ideology than on competency. Over 20 drafts of the Civil Service Statute
(CSS) have been prepared but none has been accepted, due mainly to the
lack of a scheme for Party personnel. Finally, there is a lack of a long-term
strategy on PAR,
Public sector wages have not kept up with inflation• Most of the
teachers and civil servants have to "moonlight" and hold a second job,
probably a factor behind many widely publicized allegations of bribery and
Corruption. This is a manifestation that even after half a century of armed
• . 19
struggle, the administration has still little concept of law• Corruption trials
uncover connections between SOEs, banking and Party officials, and above
all, the lack of clear rules and regulations governing the management of
these institutions. As a result, the GOV has to introduce new laws on
corruption. Unless civil servants secure a stake in the success of reforms,
the bureaucracy can be expected to position itself to delay or distort various
policy reform efforts•
These examples illustrate the various technical difficulties that arise
from the hnplementation of PAR in a transitional economy, it requires time,
manpower, knowhow and resources to overcome administrative and legal
hurdles. Presently, both ideological and technical difficulties are constraints
to the deepening and widening of PAR changes•
Challenges
Amid all the difficulties of recriminations of investors and farmers,
the financial crisis and the slow down of the economy, etc., needs are
escalating for public administration reforms. The challenge is the creation
of a professional civil service, which will manage the change within the rule
of law.
L_UNDP, "Catching up - Capacity Development for Poverty Elimination in Vietnam," UNDP,
and UN[CEF, Hanoi, Oct. 1996, page 108.
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Need for a professional civil service
There is a discrepancy between the objectives and the means. VN's
economy is marred by lack of .capital for investment and its backward
technology. 2° Its objective to double its GDP per capita requires external
funding estimated at US$21 billion. 21For this, the public sector must identify
and prepare projects, manage international investments according to
international financial and economic standards. As witnessed by the low
absorptive capacity for investments, there are signs that the public
administration does not have the necessary staff and competencies to
implement the reform process pursuant to government policies. For example,
only 6 percent of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) commitment was
disbursed in 1996. •
The urgent need for a more professional civil service is clear in
imbalances that exist between North and South, especially between urban
and rural areas. Poverty has been reduced by 35 percent since the Doi
Moiff nevertheless, poverty remains widespread and VN is still a very poor
country byall standards. This need is likewise manifested in the recent
rural protest against corrupt bureaucrats in Thai Binh, Ha Tay, and Dong
23
Nai provinces.
The lack of professional civil service, the environment for private sector
development becomes risky. Alliances between line ministries, large state
enterprises, state banks and foreign investors are impediments to
development. The recent binge of trade- and investment-related borrowing
by state enterprise has brought financial crisis. The initial optimism of
foreign investors is being tempered by bureaucratic inefficiency and unsettled
official policy, thus, the euphoria has worn off. Signs of economic slow-
down due to red tape, lack of absorptive capacity and lack of trained
personnel make things worse.
_°Tran van Tue, 'Won va Tal san Doanh nghiep nha nuoc," (Capital and assets of SOEs)
Thoi Bao Kinh Te, Hanoi, 28 Sept. 1996. Quy Hao, "Ganh nang Tren duong Cotag Nghiep Hoa,"
Liabilities on the road to Industrialization), Thoi Bao Kinh Te, Hanoi, 26 Oct. 1996.
21"Public Investment Programme 1996-2000," Ministry of Plan and Investment, Hanoi,
June 1996, page 14,
_See ibid 13 page • 1.
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VN has adopted the "gradual, step-by-step approach" for policy reform.
However, this approach without the benefit of a long-term strategy for change
is no longer appropriate in a fast-changing world.. VN cannot afford to
continue with this "learning-by-doing" approach without a long-term plan.
Without a professional and competent civil service, under the aegis of the
rule-of-law, the country may not benefit fully from accelerated and
sustainable growth and development.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The transformation undergone by VN with the Doi Moi process during
the last decade has been significant. The initial wave of reforms
(macroeconomic, monetary, budget, fiscal, etc., and the establishment of a
legal infrastructure) has brought inflation down without causing a recession.
The Constitution., the new role of the NA and reliance on limited
elections are signs of the growing emphasis on legal legitimacy. The public
administration reform has followed a transformational pattern, thus,
avoiding disruptions. It followed an incremental and pragmatic reform
strategy due to the fractured political leadership and competing interests.
It started with the search for legitimacy based on the rule of law, the
establishment of the 1.992 Constitution and. sequential adjustment of
institutions and procedures to the economic development.
The ongoing wave of reform aimed at improving the functioning and
change of state institutions' functions, especially the government's role in
economic development has been redefined. However, this was stalled because
of ideological disagreement between various factions within the Party. There
is more openness in the Vietnamese society and a trend toward using the
rule of law as a legitimate channel for addressing social grievances.
However, when stabilization has been successful, crises were overcome
and foreign investment began to flow in, ideology returned to hamper the
PAR process. Vietnam's leaders sought to develop a socialist market economy.
As a matter of ideological faith, they believed they would lose political power
if they loosened their grip on the economy. Evidences suggested that :[ear
from party members to lose control was a major impediment to relbrms.
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on next PAR steps to be taken. One of the main problems was the
nonsynchronization between economic reform on one hand and
administrative reform on the other,
Economic reform has outpaced administrative reform. Until a strong
leadership emerges or an "external shock" dampens VN's economy, there
may be some slowdown in the PAR process, The strong interplay of political
forces with competing interests has divided the leadership and has reduced
chances for higher economic growth at the time when VN needed additional,
deeper and wider reforms in its drive for "catching-up" with neighboring
countries in the ASEAN.
The sustainability of the reform process will require that various
groups (farmers, businesses, civil servants, party members, etc.) have a
stake. The consensus is that there is no backpedaling on reforms. VN is in
a position of a cyclist 24 who will fall if he does not continue to pedal.
The Party should not fear the creation of a professional civil service,
which will help design a long-term plan for change. The definition of a
relationship between the Party and the state apparatus, and the division of
labor between the two should be the next priority of the PAR reform.
Amid the Asian crisis, there are signs that the government is now
more prepared to tackle Vietnam's mostly loss-making 6,000 state firms.
The political nature of reforming SOEs is highlighted by the tensions between
politics and economics. Amid the recent rural disturbances, Party ideologues
are also warming to the idea that urgent action is needed to improve the
living and farming standards of Vietnam's peasant landholders. Hope is
rising in government that a "second wave" of concrete reforms could soon
begin. But without a proper role between the party and state machinery,
the continuation of the Doi Moi will be difficult at best.
a'_R.Morey in "international Colloquium on Public Administration," Hanoi, Sept. 24..26,
1996.